Τετάρτη 23 Αυγούστου 2017
"Law (and translations thereof) is whatever social groups conventionally attach the label "law" to."
"Natural necessity owing to human nature and requirements and tendencies within social groups appears to be behind fundamental aspects of law. Scientific evidence presently is thin, so these assertions are speculative. The universality of family units and universal reactions that property of others should not be taken, deceptive exchanges are wrong, and intentional injuries are wrong suggest there is a naturalistic basis for basic rules of social intercourse (although the content of the rules vary accross societies) - the first connotation of law. The apparent necessity for large social groups to use hierarchical organizations to manage cooperation and conflict, which operate more effectively whwn backed by organized coercive force, is behind the second connotation of law. Another apparently universal trait within social groups is a strong sense of justice and fairness (again with much variation), which underlies the third connotation of law."
"All forms of law operate in social space alongside and dependent on other norms, rules, institutions, and modes of ordering - customs, morals, etiquette, habits, practices, institutional structures, language, shared concepts and ideologies. The thick social nromative stew has many ingredients, law one among others, which often exert greater immediate influence than law. Formal legal institutions are influenced by and rely on supportive social beliefs and institutions."
Τα αποσπάσματα είναι από το εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον καινούριο βιβλίο:
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 194-196.
Οι φωτογραφίες είναι από το Ναύπλιο - Αύγουστος 2017.
Τρίτη 22 Αυγούστου 2017
Θα κυκλοφορήσει τον Νοέμβριο 2017
Μεγάλη η χαρά μου που συμμετέχω:
PART I PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
1. Law and Anthropology: Research Traditions
Sally Falk Moore
2. Whose Comparative Law? A Global Perspective
PART II COMPLEXITY, LEGAL PLURALISM AND TOTALITY OF LEGAL IDEAS
3. Anthropology on Trial: the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Controversy (1993-2001)
P. G. McHugh
4. First Nation Control over Archaeological Sites: Contemporary Issues in Heritage Law, Policy and Practice
5. The Hybridity of Law in Namibia and the Role of Community Law in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Oliver C. Ruppel and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting
6. Legal Pluralism – Linking Law and Culture in National Resource Co-Management and Environmental Compliance
PART III LEGAL SCHEMES OF MEANING AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LAW
7. Governance Disputes Involving First Nations in Canada: Culture, Custom and Dispute Resolution Outside of the Indian Act
William B. Shipley
8. Anthropology in International Law: the Case of Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage
9. Cultural Landscapes Significant to Indigenous Peoples
James A. R. Nafziger
PART IV COSMOPOLITAN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
10. Narrative of Laws, Narratives of Peoples
Elina N. Moustaira
11. Images of Muhammad: Religious Law and Freedom of Expression
PART V HISTORICAL ORIENTATION
12. Law, Society and Landscape in early Scandinavia
13. Transgenic Maize: The Mexican Cultural Battle
Jorge Sanchez Cordero
14. A Trinity of Culture, Law and Politics: Legal Anthropology of the Bonded Labor System in Nepal
Upendra D. Acharya
PART VI CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES
15. Global Law Firms in Real-World Contexts: Practical Limitations and Ethical Implications
16. An Historical, Cultural and Political Perspective of Corruption in the Balkans
PART VII IN-DEPTH FIELD RESEARCH
17. The Anthropologist as Expert Witness: A Personal Account
18. Intellectual Property Law in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Trademark ‘Piracy’ in Guatemala
19. The Voice of the Stranger: Foreign L.L.M. Students’ Experiences of Culture, Law and Pedagogy in US Law Schools
PART VIII RELATIONSHIP WITH LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITIONS AND ITS THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
20. Distance in Law and Globalisation: Armchair Anthropology Revisited
Δευτέρα 21 Αυγούστου 2017
Τα είχε πει πολύ καθαρά, ο Montesquieu, στο "De l'esprit des lois", 1748 (GF Flammarion, Paris 1979):
"Elles [les lois] doivent être tellement propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, que c'est un très grand hasard si celles d'une nation peuvent convenir à une autre.
Il faut qu'elles se rapportent à la nature et au principe du gouvernement qui est établi, ou qu'on veut établir; soit qu'elles le forment, comme font les lois politiques; soit qu'elles le maintiennent, comme font les lois civiles.
Elles doivent être relatives au physique du pays; au climat glacé, brûlant, ou tempéré; à la qualité du terrain, à sa situation, à sa grandeur; au genre de vie des peuples, laboureurs, chasseurs, ou pasteurs : elles doivent se rapporter au dégré de liberté que la constitution peut souffrir, à la religion des habitants, à leurs inclinations, à leurs richesses, à leur nombre, à leur commerce, à leurs moeurs, à leurs manières : enfin elles ont des rapports entre elles; elles en ont avec leur origine, avec l'objet du législateur, avec l'ordre des choses sur lesquelles elles sont établies. C'est dans toutes ces vues qu'il faut les considérer."
Και για όσους δεν διαβάζουν γαλλικά, στην αγγλική μετάφρασή του (Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge University Press 1989, p. 8-9):
"Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made, that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another.
Law must relate to the nature and the principle of the government that is established or that one wants to establish; whether they form it, as may be said of political laws; or whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.
They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established. They must be considered from all those points of view."
Τρίτη 8 Αυγούστου 2017
Από το κείμενο του αείμνηστου H. Patrick Glenn, Choice of Logic and Choice of Law, in: Law and the New Logics (Edited by H. Patrick Glenn and Lionel D. Smith), Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 162-163.
"Through most of Western legal history, differing laws were not seen as in conflict. Medieval legal orders were harmonized in their diverse operations on the same territory through multiple interpretive devices. The notion of a common law was vital to this process and the (multiple) common laws of Europe all functioned in the same manner, acting as supplemental or relational laws, yielding to all manner of local laws and local particularities. They were multivalent in contemplating the operation both of their own norms and thos of particular, differing, laws within the same territory. The common laws, in yielding, were non-monotonic in character. With the expansion of European law overseas, this essential character of the European common laws (most notably English, French, Dutch and Spanish) was retained and maginified. Multivalence and non-monotonicity have theirfore been the major logical devices of western legal traditions until approximately the nineteenth century."
"In some cases, this multivalence continued to prevail even through the nineteenth century process of nationalisation of law. This was the case for Equity in England. The maxims of Equity ('Equity follows the law'; 'Equity supplements but does not contradict the common law') were multivalent, interpretive devices for assuring the ongoing co-existence of the common law and Equity as distinct legal orders. The same can be said today. The trust itself may be seen as a multivalent legal instrument: the binary choice between owner and non-owner, accepted by civil law, canon law and common law courts was rejected by English Chancery judges and the intermediate notion of equitable ownership thus developed. This raises the interesting question as to what then happens once an included middle - a formerly inconceivable middle ground between some proposition and its negation - has been formalized."
Σάββατο 5 Αυγούστου 2017
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